Local state leadership: State-leading groups in governing urban China

China’s urban development has been conceptualised as a state-led, capital-driven and land-fueled process. Many studies have delved into how the state employs tactics like large-scale urban projects, infrastructure investments, ecological restoration, and land-based finance to mobilise social actors and resources towards strategic objectives (Wu, 2020). However, the structural fragmentation of China’s authoritarian system leads to increased time costs and reduced administrative efficiency in policy formulation (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). This conflicts with the local leadership’s goal of pursuing rapid urbanisation (Chien and Woodworth, 2018; Wu and Zhang, 2022), and hindered its aspirations for territorial consolidation (Hsing, 2010).

Arguably, in the era of decentralisation, conflicts and contradictions within the administrative system are crucial in shaping China’s urbanisation process (Catier, 2015). However, current research has predominantly concentrated on the interplay between the state and non-state actors, examining how their conflicts impede or modify the execution of government strategies, while overlooking the internal conflict and negotiation within the state. Specifically, there is a gap in understanding how local authorities leverage their resources and authority to convert decentralised power into effective control, address internal fragmentation within the state, and foster cohesive action to expedite projects of “rapid” territorialisation of cities.

We believe that understanding the process of state-led urban development in China requires attention to its unique party-state system and an understanding of the coordination of goals and relational interactions between heterogeneous state subjects. Hence, we try to ask how local leadership entrusted with governance responsibilities can translate decentralised authority into effective territorial control? Particularly, how does it use organisational capacity to discipline fragmented administrations and bring about unity of action, and how does it mobilise labour and resources to maintain the legitimacy of its rule?

We examine the urban development strategies and pro-growth politics in China from a local state leadership perspective, focusing on the power dynamics within the local state leadership under China’s fragmented authoritarian system. We notice that state leading group is an innovative governance technique intentionally designed to overcome the institutional flaws of “tiao-kuai segmentation.” It plays a critical role in fostering a common vision of “growth promotion,” aligning goals and unifying actions in the administrative system, broadening social consensus, and promoting public-private partnerships. Through the lens of local state leadership, our study reveals the heterogeneity of the state and enriches the understanding of state-led urban development. Simultaneously, using China as a methodology, we call for a reflection on the importance of focusing on conflicts within the state rather than just between state and non-state actors when exploring the “politics of urban growth.”

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